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I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been said "Sureties are the darlings of the law." Over
the years that love-fest has been well proved. After Pearlmanv. Reliance Ins. Co.2 was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1962, nearly
everyone was fully convinced of the law's deference for the position of
the surety. In Pearlman,the trustee, in the course of a bankruptcy
proceeding instituted by the contractor who had failed to pay for labor
and materials, induced the government's contracting officer to turn
over the contract balances. As might be expected, the trustee, once
capturing the contract balances, refused to pay them over to the
surety. The trial court vacated the referee's order and awarded the
contract balances to the surety.3 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.4
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's holding that under
the Miller Act bond,5 a surety who had paid laborers and materialmen
was entitled to the unpaid contract balance. However, the Court was
decisively split on which theory should underlie the decision.
2.
3.
4.
5.

371 U.S. 132 (1962).
In re Dutcher Constr. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 441 (W.D.N.Y. 1961).
In re Dutcher Constr. Corp., 298 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1962).
40 U.S.C. § 270(a)(1988).
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The majority opinion in Pearlman,written by Justice Black, reasoned that the surety was entitled to the advantage of subrogation to
the rights of these materialmen and laborers whom the surety had
paid. Three justices, in a separate concurring opinion, 6 disagreed with
the rationale of awarding the contract balances to the surety. They
concluded that the surety was not subrogated to the rights of the unpaid materialmen and laborers, but rather was subrogated to the
rights of either the owner (the government, in the Pearlmancase) or
the contractor. Regardless of the correct rationale, Pearlmanremains
the flagship of the surety's right to contract balances under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.7 It establishes federal law on the subject and has been followed by many states.8
The ascendancy of the surety's priority to the contract balances did
not make everything sweet for him and sour for everyone else. The
trouble for the surety is that now someone is continually trying to defeat its claim for priority rights against the contract proceeds under
the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.")9
For example, the discussion of the issues of the U.C.C. versus equitable subrogation was recently rekindled by a Florida Intermediate
Court of Appeals decision in TransAmerica Insurance Co. v. Barnett
Bank of Marion County N.A1o The intermediate appellate court affirmed a trial court decision holding that the surety's equitable subrogation remedy was not available since it had a convenient, practical
remedy under the U.C.C.11 The court held that a bank lender which
has previously filed its security agreement under the U.C.C. (securing
its loans to a construction contractor with an assignment of contract
proceeds), had priority over the surety's later U.C.C. filing of its assignment of contract balances in the contractor's application for a payment bond. Chief Justice Sharp wrote a strong dissent, arguing that
the surety should prevail since the remedy of equitable subrogation
6. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 142-44 (1962)(Clark, J., joined by
Douglas, J., and Brennan, J., concurring).
7. Prairie State Nat'l Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896); Henningsen v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908); and United States v. Munsey Trust Co.,
332 U.S. 234 (1947) were all discussed in Pearlman. In Pearlman, the Court
found precedent in the two earlier cases for holding that the surety who paid
debts owed by the defaulting contractor to materialmen and laborers or who finished the performance of the contract were entitled to recovery of retainages.
The Court then held that neither the Miller Act nor the Munsey Trust Co. decision changed that result.
8. See TransAmerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 540 So. 2d 113, 117 (Fla. 1989) and
cases cited therein.
9. The U.C.C. was not involved nor alluded to in Pearlman. All references will be
to the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFIcIAL TEXT WITH COMMENrs (1978), unless specified [hereinafter "U.C.C."].
10. 524 So. 2d 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
11. Id. at 447.
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had long been recognized in Florida and that the U.C.C. should not
govern the surety's claims.12
Upon further appeal, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the
lower court decision and remanded.13 The court held that the surety's
assignment is not a security interest under the U.C.C. Instead, it is a
contingent assignment based on contractual performance excluded
under U.C.C. § 9-104. In addition, even if it were a U.C.C. security
interest, the surety's assignment would not abrogate the doctrine of
equitable subrogation. The court noted that equitable subrogation
arises as a matter of law, not contract, and that the U.C.C. is expressly
supplemented by general principles of law and equity. The Court then
concluded that in the interest of both the parties involved and uniformity of laws, the surety should have priority to the extent of its
performance.
In reaching its decision, however, the Florida Supreme Court again
struggled with the theory of subrogation. The Court noted that the
surety's subrogation right is one in which the surety is entitled to
stand in (i)the shoes of the bond obligee; (ii) the shoes of the contractor; and (iii) the shoes of the subcontractor or materialman. The Florida Supreme Court then said, "These rights of the surety as subrogee
are not inferior even to the rights of the obligee and may be asserted
against the obligee."14 It then turned to the public policy of uniform
laws and encouraging prompt performance by the surety to ultimately
justify its holding. Thus, after struggling with the theory of subrogation, the Court upheld the surety's priority to the contract proceeds.
TransAmerica illustrates that the surety's claims to contract funds
under equitable subrogation are subject to continuing attack for two
primary reasons. First, the theoretical basis for the surety's priority is
open to argument. Second, the disappointed banker facing serious financial loss through the failed contractor has a lot of monetary incentive to attack the surety's position.
TransAmerica also demonstrates why the surety cannot completely ignore the U.C.C. Equitable subrogation has so far been limited to recovery of contract balances to reimburse costs of completing
performance. In TransAmerica,the surety failed in its effort to set-off
excess funds from other contracts to reduce its losses incurred on the
job at issue. The Florida Supreme Court held: "Priority based on equitable subrogation in one contract does not provide priority in excess
15
funds from another contract."
Thus, equitable subrogation remains a viable theory of recovery as
to contract proceeds. However, the surety in a defaulting contractor
12. Id. at 447-51 (Sharp, C. J., dissenting).
13. TransAmerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 540 So.2d 113, 117 (Fla. 1989).
14. Id. at 116.

15. Id.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:664

situation faces problems and monetary losses which equitable subrogation will not cure. The U.C.C. may offer solutions to some of these
problems. Thus, the issue remains: Should the surety rely solely on
equitable subrogation or should it pursue available remedies under the
U.C.C.?
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE
A hypothetical case will help illustrate the differences between equitable subrogation and the U.C.C. and highlight the issues raised by
this tension. The following discussion provides guidance for deterinining whether the surety should rely on its rights of equitable subrogation or file its indemnity agreement under the U.C.C.16
Contractor was the successful bidder on a project to erect a large building
in Nebraska. The owner required a payment bond and a performance bond
for the full contract amount of $800,000.00. The contractor applied to a surety
and the application included a general indemnity agreement containing the
following clauses:
Assignment -. .. Third: The contractor ... will assign ... and does hereby
assign, transfer and set over to the surety, as collateral, to secure the obligations in any and all of the paragraphs of this Agreement and any other indebtedness and liabilities of the contractor to the surety, whether heretofore or
hereafter incurred, the assignment in the case of each contract to become effective as of the date of the bond covering such contract, but only in the event
of (1) any.. breach of any contracts referred to in the bonds or of any breach
of any said bonds; or .... (6) ... : (a) all of the rights of the contractor in, and
growing in any manner out of, all contracts referred to in the bonds, or in, or
growing in any manner, out of the bonds; (b) all the rights, title and interest of
the contractor in and to all machinery, equipment, plant, tools and materials
which are now, or may hereafter be, about or upon the site or sites of any and
all of the contractual work referred to in the bonds or elsewhere, including
materials purchased for or chargeable to any and all contracts referred to in
the bonds, materials which may be in process of construction, in storage elsewhere... ; (c) ... (d) all actions, causes of action, claims and demands whatsoever which the contractor may have or acquire against any subcontractor ... ;
(e) any and all percentages retained and any and all sums that may be due or
hereafter become due on account of any and all contracts referred to in the
bonds and all other contracts whether bonded or not in which the contractor
has an interest.
Uniform Commercial Code - Fifth: That this Agreement shall constitute a
security agreement to the surety and also a financing statement, both in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Cede of every jurisdiction wherein such code is in effect and may be so used by the surety
without in any way abrogating, restricting or limiting the rights of the surety
under law or in equity.
Takeover - Sixth: In the event of any breach, delay or default asserted by the
16. The authors wish to acknowledge that many issues raised herein have not been
fully decided by the courts. In this article, the authors have at times made some
rather flat conclusions about the results of this hypothetical case. However, the
article must be read as a suggestion of possible arguments and postulates under
the U.C.C. in relation to the surety's position. Some conclusions set forth herein
are still hotly debated between even the authors of this article.
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obligee in any said Bonds, or the contractor has suspended or ceased work on
any contract or contracts covered by any said bonds, or failed to pay obliga-

tions incurred in connection therewith,... the surety shall have the right, at
its option and in its sole discretion and is hereby authorized... to take possession of any part or all of the work under any contract or contracts covered by
any said Bonds ... and to complete or arrange for the completion of the same,
and the contractor and Indemnitors shall promptly, upon demand, pay to the
surety all losses and expenses so incurred...17

The surety issued the bonds in reliance upon the application and
audited financial statements of the contractor. However, the surety
did not file the indemnity agreement in accordance with the U.C.C.
With bond in hand, the contractor then obtained a $700,000.00 operating line of credit for the project from the bank, secured by an assignment to the bank of the contract proceeds and a blanket security
interest in the contractor's accounts, contract rights, inventory, general intangibles, and equipment previously owned or thereafter acquired, as securing all indebtedness including future advances. The
bank properly filed financing statements to perfect its assignment and
security interest. Immediately thereafter, the contractor drew funds
on its line of credit and purchased a new backhoe for use on the job.
The contractor arrived on site and commenced construction, but
soon defaulted and deserted the job. The owner promptly made claim
to the surety on the bonds, hoping that the surety would choose to
complete performance.
The surety inspected the project and found that while the job was
only 50% completed, $600,000.00 had been properly paid to the contractor under a contract provision allowing full payment for materials
delivered to the site and 80% payment against labor costs incurred.
A takeover contractor was found who agreed to complete the work
for $300,000.00 if he could use the materials on the site; otherwise, he
would charge $400,000.00. In negotiations, the owner offered to accept
$200,000.00 in cash payment from the surety and a waiver of surety's
right to the contract balance in lieu of completion of the work. Thus,
the surety found itself facing a minimum loss of $100,000.00 if it hired
the takeover contractor and obtained possession of the materials.
Otherwise, a cash settlement with the owner or completion of the
work without use of the materials on site would result in a $200,000.00
loss.
The contractor had, of course, collapsed financially. Its only assets
remaining were its equipment, including the backhoe, and the materials on site. The bank loan was in default. The bank immediately
made claim on the owner for the contract balance. The bank also in17. The form of the general indemnity agreement used in the hypothetical case is set
out in CUSHYAAN & STAMM, HANDLING FIDELITY AND SuRETY CLAIMS, App. 39,
General Agreement of Indemnity, at 330-31 (Wiley Law Publications 1984).
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stituted a replevin action to recover the equipment and materials on
site.
This hypothetical case was designed to illustrate the operations of
the U.C.C. in a typical dispute between the bank and surety by raising
the following issues:
1. Who has the superior claim to the contract balance?
2. Who has the superior claim to the materials on site?
3. Who has the superior claim against the construction equipment on site?
4. What are the benefits and the disadvantages of filing the
indemnity agreement as a security agreement and financing statement under the U.C.C.?
It is important to emphasize the key facts of the hypothetical case
to set the stage for determining the positions of the bank and the
surety under the U.C.C. First, this is a private project located in Nebraska;18 it is not a federal project. Second, the contractor first executed security agreements in favor of the surety in the bond
application and then to the bank as part of the loan transaction.
Third, the surety did not file its indemnity agreement in accordance
with the U.C.C. The bank, on the other hand, did file a financing
statement in relation to its security agreement. 19 Fourth, there are no
unpaid materialmen or laborers in this problem; we are only dealing
with the performance bond in this hypothetical. Finally, in the hypothetical case, performance of the contract has not been completed.
III. THE U.C.C. AND EQUITABLE SUBROGATION
With these facts in mind, let us first examine the relevant differences between the positions of the bank and the surety under the
U.C.C. The principal difference is that the bank apparently has a
"perfected security interest" while the surety has only an "unperfected security interest."
A.

The Bank Has Superior Claims to the Contractor's Assets Under the
U.C.C.

Under the U.C.C. provisions relating to secured transactions, a security interest is an "interest in personal property or fixtures which
18. Nebraska law recognizes the doctrine of equitable subrogation. See, e.g., Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Lane Contracting Corp., 227 F. Supp. 143 (D.Neb. 1964). However,
we have found no cases under Nebraska law in which the conflict between the
U.C.C. and equitable subrogation has been raised or decided.
19. For the purposes of this paper we will assume that the indemnity agreement
could have been filed under the U.C.C. as a financing statement and that the
bank's filing was in the correct office and properly described the collateral at
issue. However, in real life, issues as to the appropriateness of documents and
filings should not be overlooked.
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secures payment or performance of an obligation." 20 It is created by
agreement between creditor and debtor and becomes enforceable and
"attaches" when (1) either the collateral is in possession of the secured
party or the debtor has signed an agreement containing an adequate
description of the collateral; (2) value has been given; and (3) the
debtor has rights in the collateral.21 Once the interest attaches, it is
enforceable against the debtor.2 2 However, to be superior to and enforceable against third parties, the security interest must also be
"perfected."
"Perfection" is a term of art under the U.C.C. It means that the
secured party has taken all steps necessary under the U.C.C. to enable
it to enforce its security interest against subsequent lienholders or
purchasers for value. 23 Depending on the type of collateral involved,
perfection may be accomplished by filing an appropriate notice in the
designated public office, taking possession of collateral, or both.24 Underlying the requirement of "perfection" is the concept of notice.
Before an interest in personal property may be enforceable against
third parties (such as other secured creditors and purchasers for
value), there must be actual or constructive notice of the creditor's
claim of an interest in such property.
Possession of collateral is an excellent but often impractical way of
notifying others of claims to the personal property. Therefore, in
some instances (such as for inventory and equipment), a financing
statement must be filed with the designated office as constructive notice to the world of the security interest. Generally, perfection is accomplished by filing or possession. The creditor's security interest
then becomes valid, binding, and enforceable against subsequent
lienholders and/or purchasers. 25
"Perfection" is extremely important when two or more creditors
claim rights in the same property. A perfected security interest has
priority over an unperfected security interest. 2 6 Priority between two
perfected security interests is generally awarded to the first in time to
either file or perfect.21 Priority allows the holder, upon repossession
and sale of the collateral, to satisfy (after expenses) its own secured
debts in full prior to any application of proceeds towards interests of
junior lienholders.28
20. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
21. Id. § 9-203(1).
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. § 9-203(2).
See, eg., id. §§ 9-203, 9-301, 9-303, 9-312.
See id. §§ 9-302, 9-303, 9-304, 9-305, 9-401, 9-402, 9-403.
See id. § 9-302.

26. Id. § 9-301(1).
27. Id. § 9-312(5).
28. Perfection is also extremely important in the context of bankruptcy. Under 11
U.S.C. § 544 (1988), the trustee may avoid or defeat any interest which would be
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Returning now to our hypothetical case, the surety's failure to file
its indemnity agreement as required to perfect its claim against the
contractor's inventory is fatal to any attempt under the U.C.C. to defeat the bank's claims under its prior perfected security interest;
therefore, the surety must seek other routes to claim superiority over
the bank's claim.
B.

The Doctrine of Equitable Subrogation

Equitable subrogation is one route available to the surety to claim
priority over the bank as to the contract funds. Broadly speaking, subrogation means that one person is substituted for and may assert the
rights and claims of another. 29 It is an equitable principle that "when
one, pursuant to an obligation-not a volunteer, fulfills the duties of
another, he is entitled to assert the rights of that other against third
persons."30
The essential elements which must be met to claim equitable sub-

rogation are as follows:
(1)

That the party claiming rights of equitable subrogation has paid the debt
or performed an obligation;
(2) That he was not a volunteer but had a direct interest in discharging the
debt or performing the obligation;
(3) That he was secondarily liable on such debt or obligation; and
31
(4) That no injustice will be done to the other party by allowance of equity.

As noted above, the United States Supreme Court in Pearlman
seemed to solidify the surety's right to contract proceeds due to the
contractor when the surety pays debts of the contractor or performs
the obligations of the contractor under its binding obligations. The
Court reasoned that:
Traditionally sureties compelled to pay debts for their principal have been
deemed entitled to reimbursement, even without a contractual promise such
as the surety here had. And probably there are few doctrines better established than that a surety who pays the debt of another is entitled to all the
voidable by a lien creditor who obtains a judicial lien on all the debtor's property
at the time the petition is filed. Under U.C.C. § 9-301, an unperfected security
interest would be subordinate to such a lien creditor. Therefore, upon the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy, the holder of an unperfected security interest suddenly becomes just another general creditor of the bankruptcy. See also 11 U.S.C.
§ 506 (1988).
29. There are two types of subrogation: "conventional subrogation" arises by agreement or in a contract between the parties. "Legal subrogation" or "equitable subrogation" is implied by law, or, more appropriately, by equity to do substantial
justice. It is this second type, "equitable subrogation" which forms the foundation for Pearlman.
30. National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843, 844 (1st
Cir. 1969).
31. See Withers, Surety v. Lender: Priority of Claims to ContractFunds, 10 WASHBURN

L.J. 356, 358 (1971).
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rights of the person he paid to enforce his right to be reimbursed.

673
32

The Court in Pearlmanheld that a surety paying materialmen and
laborers is entitled to priority as to contract funds over the claim of a
trustee in the contractor's bankruptcy proceeding. In reaching this
conclusion, the court cited the earlier case of PrairieState National
Bank v. United States,33 for the proposition that a surety who completed a contract was subrogated to the rights of the owner in the retained funds as security, and that the surety had the remedies of the
owner as against the contractor. It also discussed the holding of Henningson v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,34 that a surety
paying materialmen and laborers had similar equitable rights to retained funds. The PearlmanCourt then concluded:
We therefore hold in accord with the established legal principles stated above
that the Government had a right to use the retained funds to pay laborers and
materialmen; that the laborers and materialmen had a right to be paid out of
that fund; that the contractor, had he completed his job and paid his laborers
and materialmen, would have become entitled to the benefit of the fund; and
that the surety, having paid the laborers and materialmen, is entitled to all
35
these rights to the extent necessary to reimburse it.

Three concurring justices disagreed with the Court's theory that the
surety should prevail because it was subrogated to the rights of laborers and materialmen. The laborers and materialmen, they pointed
out, do not have enforceable rights against the government for the
funds. Quoting from United States v. Munsey Trust Co.,36 they noted:
"It is elementary that one cannot acquire by right of subrogation what
another whose rights he claims did not have.... ."37 The concurring
opinion acknowledged that the surety could be subrogated to the
rights of the owner, concluding that the rights of the surety in Pearlman arose out of the assignment of funds in the bond agreement between the surety and the contractor.38
Although Pearlmanestablished and defended the surety's rights to
contract proceeds, it left the waters muddied as to the reason for the
priority. That is, Pearlmandid not establish a clear rule that a performing surety is always entitled to the contract proceeds. Instead, it
tied the right to the surety's ability to assert others rights to the funds.
However, as the concurring opinion pointed out, even this principle
cannot be easily applied in the instance of a claim on a payment bond
such as was the case in Pearlmanitself.
As a result, the applicability of the equitable subrogation doctrine
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136-37 (1962)(citations omitted).
164 U.S. 227 (1896).
208 U.S. 404 (1908).
Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 141 (1962)(citation omitted).
332 U.S. 234 (1947).
371 U.S. 132, 144 (1962).
Id. at 143-44.
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and the priority of the surety may well depend on any one of several
factors including (1) the party whose rights are being asserted; (2)
what rights they have under this particular contract or at law; (3)
what type of bond-payment or performance-is at issue; and (4) what
are the nature and status of the funds at issue.39
These factors have often controlled the ultimate question of entitlement to the proceeds. For example, a surety completing a project
under a performance bond is not subject to set-offs of the owner
against the contractor which arise from other projects or debts.40 On
the other hand, a surety making payments to materialmen on a payment band is subject to such set-offs by the owner.4A
This highlights a major problem under subrogation: a surety can
have no greater rights than those of the person whose rights he is asserting, and the surety's position is subject to any and all defenses to
those rights.42 In other words, the surety's right to recovery depends
on the rights of others which are asserted and their defenses to those
rights.
Unfortunately, as in Pearlman,this type of analysis does not always result in a clear victory for the surety. The subcontractors or
materialmen may not have enforceable claims against the contract
funds. When contractors assign their rights to the bank, the owner
has no right against the contractor to withhold payment for a completed job. This type of analysis, required by the theory of subrogation, often results in a detailed factual and legal analysis, which, as in
the lower court opinion in TransAmerica, may well defeat the
surety.43 It certainly should discourage total reliance by the surety
upon the doctrine of equitable subrogation as its security in the event
it must perform on the bond.
The doctrine of equitable subrogation has other limitations which
affect its utility. First, it is limited to disputes over contract proceeds;
it has not been extended to cover other rights or assets of the contrac39. See Comment, Equitable Subrogation- Too Hardy a Plant to be Uprooted by Article 9 of the U.CC. ?, 32 U. Prrr. L. REv. 580, 582 (1971).
40. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968).
41. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947). Similarly, sureties have
been successful in claiming funds due and unpaid. See Industrial Bank v. United
States, 424 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1970). However, sureties have been unsuccessful in
recovery of funds already paid to the contractor or its lender. See United Pac. Ins.
Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 805 (Ct. Cl. 196).
42. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 367 F.2d 834 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Barnes v. Hampton,
198 Neb. 151, 252 N.W.2d 138 (1977). But see TransAmerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett
Bank, 540 So. 2d 113, 116-17 (Fla. 1989).
43. For another example, in Barnes v. Hampton, 198 Neb. 151, 252 N.W.2d 138 (1977),
the surety's claim against a subcontractor was barred by the applicable statute of
limitations because the contractor whose rights were being asserted under subrogation had been dissolved more than two years prior to institution of the action.
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tor. Second, Pearlman and its direct progeny are federal decisional
law which may or may not be controlling on non-federal projects involving state law. Third, by existing outside of the normal priorities as
recognized by state law or bankruptcy law, it constantly invites litigation from other creditors of the contractor who thought they were
fully secured against the contract proceeds. Each of these factors
should cause a surety to ponder the wisdom of total reliance on equitable subrogation as security for performance under a bond.
C. The Tension Between the U.C.C. and Equitable Subrogation
Whenever a contractor fails, there is a scramble among his creditors to claim as much of his property or funds as possible to satisfy or
reduce their debts and claims. When a surety takes over a project for
a defaulted contractor, it often joins the scramble. Therefore, it seems
that confrontation between the surety and the contractor's creditors is
always likely.
1. Equitable Subrogation Was Not Replaced by the U.CC.
The surety versus bank dispute predates the U.C.C. For ten years
before the 1962 decision in Pearlman,there had been a major confrontation between the banks and the sureties.
In the original text of the 1952 Official Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, proposed § 9-312(7) statedA security interest which secures an obligation to reimburse a surety... is
subordinate to a later security interest given to a secured party who makes a
new advance, incurs a new obligation, releases a perfected security interest or
gives new value to enable the debtor to perform the obligation for which the

earlier secured party is liable.

The editorial board of the framers of the U.C.C. acknowledged that
§ 9-312(7) was a "complete reversal" of the then existing case law.
Representatives of the Association of Casualty & Surety Companies
met with the editorial board and strongly protested § 9-312(7)'s reversal of the surety's established priority for contract balances. The
surety association prevailed. The board deleted the offending section
and it has never been adopted by any state.44
The exclusion of § 9-312(7) did not dissuade the banks from arguing that the surety's subrogation rights were, in fact, a security interest governed by the U.C.C. or were otherwise of a lesser priority.
However, most courts which have addressed this issue have concluded
that the surety's subrogation rights lie outside the U.C.C. and its priority provisions. 45
44. Withers, supra note 31, at 364-66; Comment, supra note 39, at 587-89.
45. See, e.g., National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843.
(1st Cir. 1969); TransAmerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 540 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1989);
Canter v. Schlager, 358 Mass. 789, 267 N.E.2d 492 (1971); Jacobs v. Northeastern
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In addition to citing the surety's triumphant defeat of proposed § 9312(7), the courts commonly note that Article 9 of the U.C.C. is limited
to security interests created by contract,48 whereas equitable subrogation arises by operation of law. The courts have also relied on U.C.C.
§ 9-103 which preserves general law not displaced by particular provisions of the code.47 In the National Shawmut case, the court also
noted that the surety's security is really the opportunity to complete
the job and apply funds available to reimburse its costs of completion.
The surety is not in the ordinary business of financing. Rather, it accepts the unliquidated and contingent risks of bonding jobs in reliance
on this opportunity which does not neatly fit within the definitions of
either "personal property" or "a security interest."48
However, the courts have also acknowledged that if the surety
wishes to rely solely on its assignment by the contractor and other
rights granted in the bond documents, then it must conform to the
U.C.C.'s filing requirements, for an "assignment" is usually considered
a security agreement under the U.C.C.49
To date, sureties have successfully defeated these attacks under
the U.C.C. However, the desperate situation of creditors of a failed
contractor probably assures that the attacks will continue.
2. Weaknesses of Equitable Subrogation
The Achilles heel of the surety's position lies not in the U.C.C. or
in the court opinions, but in the tenuous applicability of the doctrine
of equitable subrogation to the surety-contractor situation. Despite
surety lawyers' efforts to claim the name "equitable subrogation" for
the concept that the surety receives the contract proceeds, that doctrine is not really a mainstream function of subrogation. In TransAmerica, the Florida Intermediate Court of Appeals examined the
concepts of contractual and equitable subrogation in theory and then
noted that under modern commercial reality, the concept of equitable
Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49 (1965); Gallagher, UnpaidSubcontractor'sRight To
Payment Out of ContractFunds, 10 THE CONSTRUCTION LAWYER 9-13 (Forum on
the Construction Industry, American Bar Association, Jan. 1990.)

46.
47.
48.
49.

The Florida

Supreme Court in TransAmerica seems to have been persuaded from applying
the U.C.C. because the Drafting Committee of the U.C.C. had rejected a proposed
provision which would have granted the lending bank, with a prior recorded security statement, priority over the surety's subrogation right.
See U.C.C. § 9-102(2).
See Canter v. Schlater, 358 Mass. 789, 792, 267 N.E.2d 492, 494 (1971); TransAmerica Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d 113, 116 (Fla. 1989).
National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843, 845-46
(1969).
See Canter v. Schlater, 358 Mass. 789, 792, 267 N.E.2d 492,494; U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37),
9-102, 9-106.
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subrogation does not really fit the situation of the modern-day surety.
The court commented:
The second type of subrogation is the remedy known as "equitable subrogation." This concept originated in equity to provide a remedy to one (the plaintiff) whose property had been used, more or less inadvertently, to satisfy and
discharge an obligation of another (the obligor or debtor) under circumstances
such that if the plaintiff were not subrogated to the rights of the obligee (the
creditor) against the obligor (debtor), the obligor (debtor) would be unjustly
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff. In effect, the remedy of equitable
subrogation merely implies in law a reimbursement agreement or assignment
of rights in favor of one (the plaintiff) whose property was used to discharge
the obligation of another. However this just does not seem to describe the
situation of the modern day payment or performance bond surety who regularly and in the course of.business for profit, undertakes the calculated risk of
guaranteeing to an owner payment and performance by a contractor. When
such a surety performs under its bond it is merely fulfilling its own undertaking. Such a surety has ample opportunity to make any contractual subrogation agreement it desires, not only with the contractor but also with the owner
for whose protection the surety bonds are issued. The original purposes of
equitable subrogation do not appear to exist where a surety has, as appellant
surety company has in this case, intentionally and contractually, for a consideration, obligated itself to perform a contractor's contractual duties and the
surety is not seeking to enforce the original obligee's (the owner's) rights
against the original obligor (the contractor) or vice versa.50

Second, equitable relief is generally only available when there is no
adequate remedy at law. It has now become common practice to include terms granting security interests in property under the bond applications as in the hypothetical case, which raises a question of
whether an adequate remedy at law is available. At least one court
has commented that the similar concept of equitable liens has been
discarded because of the minimum requirements under the U.C.C. for
obtaining a legal lien.S1 The availability of a legal remedy under the
U.C.C. may cause the courts to look less favorably on the surety's position. However, to date this argument has been generally rejected and
one state court has even held that filing under the U.C.C. is not a
waiver of equitable subrogation rights.5 2
A third problem is that the surety must always search to find a
right of another to be asserted. If the right relied upon is an assignment under the bond application or otherwise, the U.C.C. may well
defeat the claim. Similarly, assertion of an assignment or contract
right in favor of another may also be subject to defeat under the
U.C.C. because a subrogee can assert no greater rights than his subrogor had.Sw If the right relied upon is found to be a "security interest"
50. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 524 So. 2d 439,455-57 (Fla. 1988), quashed
and renmanded, 540 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1989) (footnotes omitted).
51. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Brunken & Son, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 290 (D.S.D. 1973).
52. American Oil Co. v. L. A. Davidson, Inc., 95 Mich. App. 70,290 N.W.2d 144 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1980).
53. See Barnes v. Hampton, 198 Neb. 151, 252 N.W.2d 138 (1977).
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in favor of the owner or a materialman, then the surety proceeding
under equitable subrogation may well lose to the bank because the
right asserted is nothing more than an unperfected security interest.
3. PotentiaI Uses of the U.C.C. by Sureties
The surety may be able to achieve the same or better results as to
contract balances under the U.C.C.as it receives under equitable subrogation. If he perfects before any other security interest is filed
against the contractor's property, he will have priority under U.C.C.
§ 9-312 as to all contractor's assets as described in the indemnity agreement.5 4 Even if there is a prior perfected security interest on all of the
contractor's assets, or on all of his "accounts," the concept of a
"purchase money security interest" may still give the surety priority
as to the contract proceeds. U.C.C. § 9-107 provides:
A security interest is a purchase money security interest to the extent that it

is:
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure
all or part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring
an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire
rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so
used.55

In general, the importance of the classification as a "purchase
money security interest" is that it will take priority over a prior perfected security interest in the same collateral if it "is perfected at the
time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten days
thereafter."56 Thus, it is possible, in the limited circumstance of a
purchase money security interest, to defeat a prior perfected security
interest as to particular collateral obtained as a direct result of the
furnishing of value by the party claiming a purchase money security
interest to acquire that collateral.
Furnishing a bond for a project would seem to constitute incurring
an obligation which gives value to enable the debtor (i.e., the contractor) to obtain the collateral (i.e., a contract right to payment) that is
necessary to obtain financing for the project. As such, perfecting the
assignment under the indemnity agreement before or within ten days
of the execution of the construction contract may give the surety a
purchase money security interest and accordingly give the surety priority over the bank as to contract balances.57
However, any claim to other collateral described in the indemnity
54. It must be noted that the collateral description in the general agreement of indemnity does not utilize the U.C.C. description system and may cause disputes
over the surety's priority even if filed in an appropriate and timely manner.
55. U.C.C. § 9-107. See also U.C.C. § 9-312.

56. Id. § 9-312(4).
57. See Comment, supra note 39, at 592-94.
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agreement (such as materials and equipment) would still be junior to
any prior perfected security interest in such collateral. The furnishing
of a bond only stands as an obligation incurred to enable the contractor to obtain the construction contract; it does not stand as a giving of
value to purchase materials or equipment to perform the contract.
Thus, the concept of a "purchase money security interest" cannot
be used to gain a prior position as to the contractor's existing assets.
However, it is a mechanism to obtain a first right to the contract balances under the U.C.C. alone, without any reliance on the doctrine of
equitable subrogation.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTHETICAL
Let us now return to our hypothetical to see how our surety, with
its rights of equitable subrogation and its unperfected security interest, fares against the bank.
In examining these results, it should be remembered that the
bank's position is the same as the surety's position could have been but
for its choice to not file its indemnity agreement under the U.C.C.
A.

Who Gets the Contract Balance?

The surety should prevail as to the funds remaining unpaid under
the contract by claiming subrogation to the owner's positions as to
earned but unpaid funds. The owner has a defense to payment to the
contractor by reason of its default and this defense should be sufficient
to defeat the bank's claims as assignee of the contractor's right to
payment.
1. Rights Under the U.C.C.
Under the U.C.C., the bank's claim to the contract balance stands
as a security interest in an "account" or, more particularly, in a "contract right."' 8 It is, in essence, an interest in a right to payment not
yet earned by performance. Under U.C.C. § 9-318, a secured party's
claim to an "account" under a perfected security interest is subject to
any and all defenses and claims which the account debtor (i.e., the
owner) has against the assignor (ie., the contractor). Until the "contract right" is transformed into an "account receivable" by full performance, the secured party may not force the owner to disgorge the
contract balance.
2.

Completion of Performance

However, the conclusion that the surety will prevail must be qualified. First, as noted above, completion of the project is a condition
58. See U.C.C. § 9-106.
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precedent to claiming the contract proceeds under equitable subrogation.5 9 In our hypothetical, the surety has not yet completed the project; therefore, it does not have a presently enforceable right to the
contract proceeds.
This raises a question of whether the surety, acting under the
U.C.C. with a perfected assignment, may also obtain the proceeds by
completing performance? If so, may the bank also perform the contract and earn the right to payment?
The U.C.C. implies that such a right to perform debtor's obligations
may be granted by the debtor in appropriately drafted security documents. 60 However, the U.C.C. also clearly specifies that a grant of a
security interest in an account does not create obligations or liabilities
61
in the secured party to perform the debtor's duties or obligations.
Therefore, the bank may have the right to perform but no duty to do
so. The owner would have no ability to compel the bank to complete
performance of the contract. However, the surety is liable to the
owner upon the contractor's default under the bond if the surety does
not perform.
The lack of an enforceable obligation upon the bank to perform
should also deprive it of rights of equitable subrogation. In absence of
a binding obligation or liability to complete performance, the bank or
other secured party acts as a mere volunteer in completing the work
or performing the obligation. Having no obligation to perform, the
bank does not have and may never obtain rights of equitable subrogation.62 Performance by the bank, at best, may only "crystalize" the
contractor's right to payment of the proceeds by eliminating the
3
owner's defense of nonperformance6
This highlights one serious shortcoming of the U.C.C. It is
designed to provide a mechanism to secure repayment of financial obligations. The U.C.C. is ill-equipped to cover the contingent liability of
a surety under its bond, and to give it incentive to and protection for
its efforts to honor the bond's obligations.
3. Governing Law
Another necessary qualification to the conclusion that the surety
will prevail is that both the project and contract are governed by Nebraska law. Pearlmaninvolved a federal contract, an interpretation of
a federal act (the Miller Act), and the rights of a trustee in a federal
bankruptcy. As such, it is binding only as federal law, but not under
See, e.g., United States v. Continental Casualty Co., 512 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1975).
See U.C.C. § 9-106 comments.
See id § 9-317.
See, e.g., United States v. Western Contracting Corp., 341 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir.
1965).
63. See U.C.C. § 9-317 comments.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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the laws of various states. Fortunately for our surety, Nebraska law
has adopted the doctrine of equitable subrogation.6 4 It seems probable
that the Nebraska courts will recognize the superiority of the surety's
position.
4. Conclusionsas to ContractBalances
Overall, a surety's claim under the doctrine of equitable subrogation is still superior to rights under the U.C.C. as to contract balances.
Performance by a secured party, as a volunteer under the U.C.C., may
merely earn a right of payment in favor of the contractor which the
secured party may claim by legal assignment.65 On the other hand,
the surety's subrogation to the positions of the owner and materialmen are superior to the rights derived through the contractor. Therefore, the surety should generally prevail over the claim of a lender
claiming the funds under a security interest perfected under the
U.C.C., and the courts have consistently held in favor of the surety
over the lien of a lender claiming the funds under a security interest
perfected under the U.C.C.66
B.

Who Gets the Materials?

In our hypothetical, the surety's cost of completion can be reduced
by $100,000.00 if the takeover contractor is allowed to use the materials already on the site. However, the bank has instituted a replevin
action to repossess the materials under its perfected security interests
in "inventory" of the contractor. Does the bank have a superior claim
to the materials or may the surety intervene in the replevin action to
claim the materials for its purposes?
1.

The Bank Has a Perfected Security Interest in the Materials

It appears the bank has a good claim to the materials under its perfected security interest in the contractor's "inventory." Under the
U.C.C., "inventory" is defined as goods "held by a person who holds
them for sale or lease or to be furnished under contracts of services or
if he has so furnished them, or if they are raw materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in a business."67 The U.C.C. comments further explain: "The principal test to determine whether
goods are inventory is that they are held for immediate or ultimate
sale. Implicit in the definition is the criterion that the prospective sale
64. See eg., Sheridan v. Dudden Implement, Inc., 174 Neb. 578, 119 N.W.2d 64
(1964)(not a construction contract case). See Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Lane Contracting Corp., 227 F. Supp. 143 (D. Neb. 1964).
65. But see U.C.C. § 9-106 comment.
66. See Withers, supra note 31, at 362-63.

67. U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
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is in the ordinary course of business."68
Materials furnished under a construction contract constitute "inventory" under these tests. Although a construction contract is probably not governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. governing sales, the
materials furnished under that contract clearly are "inventory" under
Article 9. The comments to U.C.C. § 9-109(4) recognized this point,
stating: "Goods to be furnished under a contract of service are inventory even though the arrangement under which they are furnished is
not technically a sale."6 9 Thus, under the U.C.C., the materials on site
should be found to constitute "inventory." The bank, therefore, has a
right to repossess and sell the materials under its security interest in
inventory.
2.

The Owner May Have Rights Superior to the Bank's Interest

In order to defeat the bank, our surety needs to find someone who
has rights superior to the Bank which can be asserted by a subrogee.
The owner may have such rights.
A perfected security interest in inventory is not enforceable
against a purchaser for value in the ordinary course of business.
U.C.C. § 9-307 provides that "a buyer in the ordinary course of business . . . takes free of a security interest created by his seller even
though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer
knows of its existence."7o This provision is primarily applied to the
sale of inventory due to the limitation that the sale must be to the
'buyer in the ordinary course of business." 71 The U.C.C. defines
'buyer in the ordinary course of business" as "a person who in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the
ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys
in the ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of
that kind... "72 Of course, materials specially purchased by the contractor for a particular project are not the same as toasters on a retail
shelf offered to the general public. Is the contractor really "in the
business of selling goods of that kind?" However, there is an argument that a contractor routinely "sells" building materials. Therefore, upon purchase, the owner may take the materials free of the
security interest of the bank, even if he knows of the bank's security
interest, so long as he does not know that the sale is in violation of the
73
bank's security agreement with the contractor.
However, the owner's protection from the bank's claim under § 968.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. § 9-109 comment 3.
Id.
Id. § 9-307(1).
Id. comment 2.
Id. § 1-201(9).
Id. § 9-307 comment 2.
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307 depends on whether the materials have been "sold" to the owner
prior to the bank's assertion of the claim. Under the U.C.C., a sale is
defined as the passage of title from the seller to the buyer for a price. 74
U.C.C. § 2-401 provides that title passes, in absence of other agreement, when the seller completes his performance with reference to
physical delivery of the goods.75
Thus, the validity of the owner's claim against material may depend on whether the contractor has completed his obligations of delivery. The bank may well argue that, under a construction contract, the
contractor has not completed his performance as to delivery until the
material has been installed. The owner may counter under our hypothetical by pointing out that the materials were in fact paid for in full
upon delivery to the job site, and therefore the sale has been
completed.
So who wins? Probably the attorneys who will battle over this
question in court to clarify ownership in the uncertain context of applying the U.C.C. concept of sales within the setting of a construction
contract. However, § 9-307 gives the owner a good chance to defeat the
bank's claim.
3. The Surety Has No Enforceable Claims to Materials Under
Equitable Subrogation
Assuming that the owner may prevail against the bank as to the
materials, the surety still has not solved its problems to gain use of the
materials on site.
The surety appears to have an advantage over the bank only if it
can claim subrogation to the owner's rights as a buyer under U.C.C.
§ 9-307. However, as noted above, one essential element of equitable
subrogation is that the rights only arise upon full performance. 76 This
creates a "Catch-22" for the surety in that its right to claim the materials through the owner will arise only upon completion of performance,
and not before. The "catch" is this: without the materials, it cannot
complete performance. If it completes performance, then it will no
longer need the materials.
Therefore, although the bank may have problems in overcoming
the owner's claim to the materials, the surety's ability to obtain the
materials for its benefit is even more difficult to establish. Practically,
the owner will probably cooperate with the surety to claim the materi74. Id. § 2-106(1). But see id § 2-401(1)(title passage is generally irrelevant under the
U.C.C. except as explicitly agreed).

75. Id. § 2-401(2).
76. As discussed in section II.B, supm, performance is a condition precedent to an
enforceable right of subrogation. In most reported cases, performance is completed. Obviously, one could argue that a binding commitment to perform may
satisfy this requirement.
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als and turn them over to the surety. On the other hand, the owner,
knowing that it has the surety on the line, may forego the expense and
difficulty of defeating the bank's claims, and simply insist on performance by the surety.77 Unless the surety can raise a defense to its liability based upon the owner's failure to protect its rights in the materials
or failure to turn over such materials,7 8 the surety, without a filed and
perfected security interest, may well find itself purchasing additional
materials to complete the work or purchasing the original materials
from the bank upon sale thereof under the U.C.C.79

Another apparent alternative available to the surety would be to
assert clause Six in the bond application which allows it to take possession of the work upon the contractor's default. However, this claim is
in essence, an assignment by the contractor of rights in property arising upon the contractor's default. As a contractually-created assignment, it may be a "security interest" subject to the U.C.C., and subject
to the prior perfected security interests in the bank.80
Asserting the owner's claim under a similar contractual clause by
equitable subrogation would also appear to be similarly flawed. The
owner's claims also arise from and are derived through a contract with
the contractor. Given this fact and the limitations of equitable subrogation, a court could easily conclude that the bank's prior perfected
security interests in the materials will prevail over the owner's or
surety's unperfected right arising under the contract. In any event,
the surety would once again be dependent upon the strength of the
owner's claim and its cooperation in turning over the materials to the
takeover contractor.
In each of the options outlined above, the surety must weave an
intricate web of legal and factual theories to claim the material on site.
77. From a pragmatic view, delay of the project while disputes over materials on the
job are resolved may well mean that whatever rights to the materials under subrogation the surety may have will be worthless.

78. See United States v. Continental Casualty Co., 512 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1975).
79. Another legal route which may be available to the Surety is to claim the materials by subrogation through the materialnan's rights. Changing our hypothetical
slightly, lets assume that the materialman has not been paid in full for the materials. Under U.C.C. § 2-702, he has a right to claim the materials upon learning of
the buyer's insolvency but only if demand is made within 10 days after receipt of
the goods by the seller. The 10 day limit does not apply if a written statement of
solvency is made by the buyer within three months prior to delivery. This provision is a right to rescind the contract based upon a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency. As noted, Pearlmanindicates that the surety is subrogated to
the rights of the materialman upon payment for goods furnished. Although the
doctrine may not extend beyond claims as to contract balances, the surety may be
in a position to assert that it is equitably subrogated to the materialman's right to
reclaim the goods themselves upon full payment to the materialman. However,
given the 10 day period after delivery in which this right may be asserted, it

seems that this route of already questionable worth will seldom be available.
80. See Canter v. Schlager, 358 Mass. 789, 267 N.E.2d 492 (1971).
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Given the theoretical limitations of equitable subrogation, the surety's
chances of prevailing as to the materials are slim indeed.
4. The Surety Has Problems Even If It Filed Its Indemnity
Agreement Under the U.C.C.
On the other hand, if the surety had filed its indemnity agreement
under the U.C.C. before the bank's filing, the surety's position against
the bank would have been greatly improved. It could assert priority
over the bank under U.C.C. § 9-312(5), which generally gives priority
among conflicting perfected security interests to the party who is the
first to file or perfect.
Even if the indemnity agreement has been properly filed under the
U.C.C., the default provisions under Article 9 will plague our surety in
its efforts to use the materials in completing the project. Under
U.C.C. § 9-505, a secured party is obligated to sell collateral within 90
days after repossession. Otherwise, the debtor or the bank, at its option, may sue for conversion or recover damages under U.C.C. § 9-507.
This obligation to sell under § 9-505 is certainly inconsistent with
our surety's desire to use the materials to complete the work. If the
surety uses the materials without conducting a U.C.C. sale, it becomes
liable for any losses thereby caused to the contractor or the bank.81
The surety will also lose its rights to proceed against the contractor to
recover its ultimate losses arising from completing performance.8 2
The surety can ask the contractor and the bank to waive their
rights to recover losses from the surety under U.C.C. § 9-507(1), as allowed under U.C.C. § 9-501. However, U.C.C. § 9-501 does not allow
waiver of certain rights of the debtor (contractor). In particular, it
does not allow a waiver of the secured party's (surety's) obligation to
sell collateral under U.C.C. § 9-505.
A better approach is to structure a sale of the materials at public or
private sale as provided in U.C.C. § 9-504 to meet the surety's goal of
using the materials to reduce its cost of performing the contract. At
public sale, the surety or the takeover contractor can purchase the
materials and then use them. However, § 9-504(1) requires the proceeds of the sale to be immediately disbursed to first satisfy the expenses of the sale, then the indebtedness secured by the security
interest, then to pay junior lienors who have given proper notice of
their interest, and finally, the surplus, if any, is to be paid to the
debtor.a3
The surety has one major problem with conducting any kind of
U.C.C. sale: What is the amount of the indebtedness which is secured?
81. U.C.C. §§ 9-505-507.
82. Id. § 9-507.
83. Id. § 9-504(1).
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Once again, the U.C.C. is not well suited for use in the suretyship situation, for the surety's claim against the contractor is, at this stage, contingent and unliquidated. To merely hold all sale proceeds until its
losses are quantified may well be a violation of the U.C.C. provisions
which govern disposition of collateral. Therefore, the surety once
again is faced with a loss of its rights to proceed against the contractor
to recover its ultimate losses and faces liability to the contractor and
the bank under U.C.C. § 9-507.84
A solution to this dilemma is to quantify the loss by execution of a
contract with the takeover contractor for a fixed amount, and then by
public or private sale, sell the material to the takeover contractor and
apply the proceeds against the new contract price. This is not a perfect solution, however, because the contractor or the bank may still
protest that the sale was made on a collusive basis between the only
interested bidders (the surety and the takeover contractor) or otherwise does not conform to the technical rules of the U.C.C. If these
arguments are successful, the surety is exposed to liability in favor of
the contractor or the bank; and the surety loses entitlement to a deficiency judgment as against the contractor.
The lesson of this analysis is simply that the U.C.C. is not designed
to allow the surety to use material on site to complete a project. The
U.C.C. is designed to protect financial obligations through security interests in personal property. As such, it contemplates sale of collateral to satisfy a pre-existing debt. The U.C.C. does not contemplate
use of the materials in the takeover situation and, in essence, it requires contortions by the surety to achieve this result.
5. Conclusion - Materials
In conclusion, it seems safe to say that under our hypothetical, as
written, if the materials are or were inventory of the contractor, then
either the bank or the owner will receive them.. Absent cooperation of
the owner, side-deals, or special construction contract terms with the
owner, the surety, relying on equitable subrogation, may not be able to
obtain and utilize the materials. Even if the surety files its indemnity
agreement and proceeds under the U.C.C., the materials would not be
instantly available for use by the takeover contractor. Instead, the
surety must comply with the rules of U.C.C. § 9-504 and § 9-505 requiring the sale of the materials and a proper application of the proceeds.
84. Another option is to propose to simply keep the material in full satisfaction of the
debt under id. § 9-505(2). However, if the debtor or junior lienor objects in writing within 21 days after the notice is sent, then a sale is required. If no such
objection is received, then the secured party (surety) accepts the material in fully

satisfaction of all the debtor's (contractor's) obligations and wholly releases the
contractor from all liability under the indemnity agreement. As such, this is not
an attractive option.

1990]

EQUITABLE SUBROGATION V. U.C.C.

While filing of the indemnity agreement may reduce the surety's
ultimate loss in taking over the project, the U.C.C. generally is not
well designed to aid the surety in accomplishing its primary goal of
completing the project expediently and through the use of the materials on site.
C. Who Gets the Equipment?
In our hypothetical, the bank has also claimed the contractor's
equipment under its perfected security interest. However, the surety
naturally realizes that upon liquidation'of the equipment, it will have
no recourse to recover its losses incurred in completing the project.
Under different facts, it may also want to use the equipment to complete the project. Does the surety have any way to defeat the bank's
claim as to the equipment?
1. The Bank Has SuperiorRights to the Equipment
It is clear that the bank's perfected security interest under the
U.C.C. is superior to the unperfected security interest of the surety.
The surety's arguments are further limited by the fact that neither the
owner nor the materialmen have any apparent claim to the equipment
which may be asserted by equitable subrogation. The surety's position, therefore, does not appear hopeful.
2.

EquitableSubrogationDoes Not Give the Surety Any Rights
to Contractor'sEquipment

In desperation, we can well imagine the surety asking his lawyer
the following question: "If under Pearlman,I am entitled to the contract proceeds upon completing performance under the bond, then
why don't I also have priority as to the equipment?" The question
seems logical on the surface, for there is no apparent difference between a right to the contractor's money and a right to the contractor's
equipment. However, there is a very real difference between the
surety's position against the contract proceeds as compared to the
surety's position against the equipment.
This difference was well demonstrated in Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Brunken & Son, Inc.8 5 In that case, Aetna, as surety, took over
and completed four bonded jobs incurring a total loss, after application
of contract balances, in excess of $300,000.00. The contractor had simultaneously defaulted upon loans made by two banks which were
secured by perfected security interests in the contractor's equipment.
The banks began the process under the U.C.C. for sale of the equipment but a court-appointed receiver took over the equipment and liq85. 357 F. Supp. 290 (D.S.D. 1973).
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brought the action claim entitlement to the proceeds on a theory of an
equitable lien.
Aetna, relying on Pearlmrnand the doctrine of equitable subrogation, argued that by reason of its performance under the bonds, an
equitable lien upon the equipment arose in its favor and that this lien
had priority from the date of the bond applications. In doing so, it
relied on a granting clause in the application similar in effect to that
set forth in our hypothetical.
The court, however, was unimpressed with Aetna's position. It acknowledged that a surety has equitable rights to contract balances
under a theory of subrogation and that these rights survived enactment of the U.C.C. However, it refused to extend the doctrine to create equitable liens on personal property superior to properly perfected
security interests.
The court rejected Aetna's attempt to recast the Pearlmanline of
cases as being based on a concept of an equitable lien. Instead, the
court concluded that these cases were based upon a concept of subrogation as to others' rights to receivables due. Further, the court found
that since enactment of the U.C.C. and its minimum requirements for
lien creation, the equitable liens were in disfavor in the commercial
setting. Ultimately, the court concluded that under general principles
of equity, equitable subrogation was based on a concept that the surety
is entitled to the retained funds to prevent unjust enrichment of
others and those claiming through them. However, in this instance,
there was no unjust enrichment to the banks by allowing foreclosure
of their security interest. The court commented that "the practical
consequence of Aetna's theory is nothing less than an appropriation of
a secured creditor's collateral to reimburse the performing surety, a
judicial act in contradiction of South Dakota law."87 The court finally
held that "the interest Aetna seeks to enforce in Brunken's personal
property is by definition a 'security interest,' [citation omitted] and
therefore falls within the filing provisions of Article Nine [citation
omitted]. The failure to file and perfect its interests is fatal to Aetna's
claim in the fund now under litigation."88 In short, Aetna's arguments
86. The court analyzes the claim as if the equipment had not been sold. The security
interests in equipment under the U.C.C. attach to proceeds to the sale of collateral and have the same order of priority. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-306.
87. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Brunken & Son, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 290, 293 (D.S.D.

1973).
88. Id at 294. The court also quickly rejected Aetna's argument that the grant of an
interest in the bond applications was not governed by the U.C.C. since it arose as
a "contract right" excluded under U.C.C. § 9-104(f). The court responded that
regardless of form, the provision in the indemnity agreement granting rights in
the equipment was a grant of a security interest under the U.C.C. and was fatal to
Aetna's claim.

1990]

EQUITABLE SUBROGATION V. U.C.C.

were quickly disposed of and Aetna's claim to the proceeds from the
equipment failed entirely.

The Aetna Casualty case clearly demonstrates that the doctrine of
equitable subrogation probably will not be extended to cover equipment and materials. It did so by highlighting the concept of unjust
enrichment which underlies the doctrine.
In the case of contract balances, the surety's performance of its obligations, in essence, creates the balances or at least renders contract
funds due and payable. Without these efforts, the owner has good defenses to payment thereof to the contractor and therefore, under
U.C.C. § 9-318, the bank would have no enforceable claim. To honor
the bank's claim when these defenses have been removed by the
surety's performance would enrich the bank unjustly through the
surety's efforts. Further, honoring the bank's claim would certainly
discourage the surety from honoring its bond obligations to perform
the construction contract.
However, the surety's efforts do not furnish funds or value for the
acquisition of the equipment nor bear any relationship to the enforceability of the bank's interests therein. The bank had a right to the
equipment, whether or not the bond obligations were performed. To
award the equipment to the surety because of performance which, in
essence, had nothing to do with the equipment, would enrich the
surety unjustly at the expense of the bank. If anyone has an equitable
right to the equipment it would be the bank who probably furnished

the financing for its purchase.
In short, if the surety wishes to have good recourse in regard to the
equipment, it ought to file its indemnity agreement as a financing

statement under the U.C.C. Otherwise, it has chosen to be content to
stand as a general creditor to the balance of the contractor's assets.
3. Filing Under the U.C.C. Would Have Given the Surety Rights

in the Equipment
On the other hand, if our surety had taken its opportunity to file
and perfect its security interests before the bank perfected its security
interests, the surety would have happily been in a position to claim

most of the equipment and defeat the bank's replevin action.8 9
89. Obviously, there are numerous issues under the U.C.C. under which the bank
could attack the surety's position, not the least of which are the questions of adequacy of description of the collateral (particularly since the assignment is only as
to equipment which is or may be "upon the site" of the project), whether value
has been given, whether the granting language in the indemnity agreement is
sufficient, and whether the filing and the form of the filings are proper. These
issues are beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to say, however, that
there are plenty of points to argue under the U.C.C., even if the security interest
is perfected by a filing.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:664

Although it would have still been crippled in its efforts to use the
equipment to complete the job under the sales provisions of U.C.C.
§ 9-504 and § 9-505 as discussed above, 90 it certainly would find itself in
a much better position of recourse to lessen or eliminate its ultimate
losses.
Our hypothetical case raises one issue wherein the bank would
have had superiority over the surety even if the surety had filed under
the U.C.C. If you recall, the contractor took the bank funds and
purchased a backhoe for use on this project. This raises a question of
whether there is a "purchase money security interest" in favor of the
Bank as to the backhoe which may have priority over the surety's
prior perfected security interest. 91 Thus, even if the surety had filed
its indemnity agreement, the bank would likely be able to establish
priority as to the backhoe.
4. Conclusion - Equipment
In conclusion, absent a U.C.C. security interest properly perfected
by the surety, the bank has superior right to the contractor's equipment. The doctrine of equitable subrogation will not be of much
assistance to the surety as to such equipment or any other property of
the contractor other than contract proceeds. If the surety does file its
indemnity agreement, then it must establish its priority under the
U.C.C. and enforce its liens in accordance with its provisions.
V. WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
OF RECORDING THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
UNDER THE U.C.C.?
The hypothetical has demonstrated the differences between equitable subrogation and liens under the U.C.C. The obvious conclusions
are that equitable subrogation stands as stalwart protection for the
surety's claims to the contract balances. On the other hand, a U.C.C.
perfected security interest is necessary to allow resort to the contractor's materials and equipment. Does this mean that the surety should
always file its indemnity agreement as a financing statement with the
U.C.C.? The only real answer is maybe.
A.

Advantages of Filing Under the U.C.C.

One advantage of filing under the U.C.C. is that the surety receives
enforceable rights not only to materials and equipment but to any
other personal property of the contractor which is adequately described in the agreement. This, for example, could give the surety a
90. See discussion in section IV.B.4 supra.
91. See U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-312(4). See also id. § 9-312(3) (special rules for inventory).
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right to assert claims against owners and subcontractors and to collect
other accounts receivables and amounts due on other contracts, all in
an effort to reduce or eliminate losses from a takeover situation on
this project. This advantage carries over into bankruptcy proceedings
to give the surety specific resource to specific property and thereby
avoiding the no-win situation of being another general unsecured
creditor.
Another advantage is that a proper U.C.C. filing may discourage
disputes with the bank and others in regard to contract balances, as
well as other assets. Obviously, the banks will not be anxious to attack
the equitable subrogation rights when they will be ultimately defeated
on their "home court" under the U.C.C. It will also eliminate the perplexing question of whether the individuals who have been paid for
their services (such as laborers and materialmen) have rights to the
funds which may be asserted by the surety.
A third advantage is that the U.C.C. default provisions offer a
mechanism, through the sales processes of § 9-504 and § 9-505, to
transfer materials and equipment to a takeover contractor. However,
as discussed above,92 the sales mechanisms are somewhat ill-suited for
this use, especially when the ultimate loss to the surety is not quantified or liquidated.
Although not an "advantage," it is also comforting to know that the
courts which have addressed the issue have concluded that filing
under the U.C.C. does not waive or relinquish the rights of equitable
subrogation. 93 In essence, this is one time when you may be able to
have your cake and eat it too. However, this holding of "no prejudice
from filing" is not in accordance with the general principle that equity
is not available where the party has adequate remedies available at
law.9 4 As such, this holding may be subject to a change of position by
the courts.
B.

The Disadvantages of Filing Under the U.C.C.

The disadvantages to filing are also numerous. First, many of the
advantages disappear or are less important when the surety's filing is
subordinate to a prior perfected security interest on file against the
contractor. Except in the purchase money security interest situation
discussed earlier, the rights of a junior lienholder are always subject to
the senior lienholder's rights, including rights to possession and to the
92. See discussion in section IV.B.4 supra.
93. E.g., American Oil Co. v. L. A. Davidson, Inc., 95 Mich App. 358, 290 N.W.2d 144
(Mich. App. 1980); Canter v. Schlager, 358 Mass. 789, 267 N.E.2d 492 (1971).
94. In 0. K Door Co. v. Lincoln Eng'g Constr. Co., 174 Neb. 682,119 N.W. 153 (1963),
it was held that the implied subrogation promise arising from performance under
a bond was not enforceable when the surety subsequently took an express assignment of the construction contract proceeds.
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proceeds of the sale of collateral. The rights of a junior lienholder are
often in jeopardy. For example, under U.C.C. § 9-504, the right to
share in proceeds is dependent on the junior lienholder giving written
notice of demand therefore before distribution of proceeds is
complete.
Further, a filing of any lien will often, if not always, be a violation
of the bank's loan documentation. In essence, the surety may create
an instant default on the loan which may cause the surety to take over
projects much more quickly or frequently than the surety wishes.
Even if the surety files first, the practical consequence is that the
surety may extinguish or severely inhibit the contractor's ability to
obtain needed financing. Most banks require a first priority position
on collateral before the loan will be made. However, this may work to
the surety's advantage, especially in regard to the marginal contractor
or the new entrant, by giving the surety an opportunity to work with
the bank to define relative rights before the problems arise.
Another serious disadvantage is that the surety may offend its clients, especially the better and more financially sound clients. Obviously, they have often dealt with sureties without these formalities.
They will also recognize the restriction of credit which the surety's
filing may cause, and thus, they may shop for another surety who does
not demand the formalities of a U.C.C. filing.
Another disadvantage of filing is the added time, effort, and expense it will require. If a surety does wish to file, it will be well advised to use separate, specialized security agreements and
standardized U.C.C. financing statement forms. Many states charge
extra filing fees for non-standard forms. Several states have various
approved forms so you may end up with a drawer full of forms.
Determining the appropriate place to file is a real problem. The
U.C.C. is not, in fact, uniform as to the public office in which a filing
should be made. The appropriate office may vary within a state depending on the type of collateral in which perfection is desired. Determining the appropriate office may require investigations as to the
location of collateral, the debtor's principal place of business, and
other factual matters. In a true multi-state transaction, determining
where to file as to what type of property is even more complex.9 5 Finally, security interests in certain types of goods, most notably titled
vehicles, cannot be perfected by a simple U.C.C. filing. Additional effort will be required to claim an interest in this type of property. Ultimately, employing a service organization or attorneys in each state in
which a surety desires to file may be necessary.
The mechanics of perfection also involve proper continuances of
the filings, amendments, and termination statements. Imagine the
95. See U.C.C. § 9-103.
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time and expense which will be consumed in furnishing releases of
liens every time a major client wants to sell one piece of equipment to
buy another.
Finally, some commentators argue that acknowledgment of the applicability of the U.C.C. by filing may ultimately result in a loss of
equitable subrogation rights. The courts may soon look upon equitable subrogation with disfavor if the sureties begin to take advantage of
the U.C.C. However, language referring to the U.C.C. in bond applications may have the same effect, even without filing.96 Ultimately, this
may prove to be false reasoning as the courts can certainly consider
the availability of easily obtained legal rights under the U.C.C. even if
the surety does not file under the U.C.C.
C. Filing After Default
It may be suggested that many disadvantages of filing would be
avoided if the surety filed its indemnity agreement in accordance with
the U.C.C. only after the contractor has defaulted on the project. This
would avoid the nightmare of paperwork associated with filing and
maintaining a secured position against every contractor. It would also
avoid premature confrontation with the contractor's creditors and the
resulting restriction of his credit. However, to do so is to assume a
greater risk of ultimate loss.
The U.C.C. does not limit how long a creditor may wait before filing.97 Most creditors will perfect their secured position as soon as possible to make it enforceable against third parties. Therefore, an
outside limit on when a filing may be made in connection with a security agreement is not established within the U.C.C. Thus, late filing is
certainly permissible.
The most obvious problem with awaiting default before filing is
that the filing may be too late to be of any real value. As noted above,
priority generally dates from the time of filing.98 The surety's choice
not to file immediately will concede priority to all others who choose
to file in the interim. A late filing, in essence, will be junior to all
other liens and will give the surety priority over only the contractor's
general creditors. Therefore, assuming that a majority of defaults occur when the contractor is having financial difficulties, it seems unlikely that a late filing will often result in additional recoveries for the
surety.
The possibility of a bankruptcy filing by the contractor before or
96. See 0. K. Door Co. v. Lincoln Eng'g Constr. Co., 174 Neb. 682, 685-88, 119 N.W2d
153, 157 (1963)("[thel implied promise is by its terms inapplicable in the event

that there is an express promise on the part of the principal").
97. See U.C.C. §§ 9-303, 9-312.
98. Id. § 9-312(5).
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after default also dictates against waiting to file until a claim on the
bond is made. As an unperfected security interest, the surety's claim
against the assets of the contractor is subject to and subordinate to the
rights of a judgment lien creditor. 99 The trustee in bankruptcy is
deemed a judgment lien creditor at the time the petition is filed;-10
therefore, an unperfected security interest is not effective against the
trustee.101 Thus, if the surety has not filed a financing statement
before the petition in bankruptcy is filed, it will be reduced to the status of a general creditor except to the extent allowed under Pearlman
and its progeny as the law develops in each jurisdiction.
Further, upon filing of a petition in bankruptcy, creditors are automatically stayed from taking any act to create, perfect, or enforce a
lien against property of the bankruptcy estate or the debtorlo2 Violation of this "automatic stay" may result in both citation for contempt
of court and damages. In theory, the filing would be ineffective since
all the debtor's property is transferred to the trustee by operation of
law upon filing of a bankruptcy petition. 0O Therefore, the debtor has
no assets against which the post-petition filing would be effective.
In short, if a petition in bankruptcy is filed before the indemnity
agreement is recorded under the U.C.C., then the surety will be unable to file and will stand as a general creditor of the bankruptcy
estate.
Even if the surety files in accordance with the U.C.C., the filing
may be subject to being set aside as a voidable preference. Under 11
U.S.C. § 547, the trustee may set aside transfers of property (including
perfection of liens) made within 90 days prior to the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy which are for or in consideration of an antecedent debt
and which will allow the creditor to recover more than it would have
otherwise recovered without the transfer. 0 4 The policy is to avoid
maneuvers to improve one creditor's position at the expense of the
others. An argument could be made that the filing of the indemnity
agreement under the U.C.C. after default is not "for or in consideration of an antecedent debt" because the contractor had no immediate
liability to the surety until default on the project. On the other hand,
the concept that the surety's rights "relate back" to the date when the
bond was issued may make this liability an "antecedent debt." Which
argument will prevail is a decision for the courts. Perhaps it is reasonably predictable that any surety unfortunate enough to have filed its
indemnity agreement within 90 days prior to a bankruptcy filing will
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. § 9-301.
11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988).
U.C.C. § 9-301.
11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).

103. See id. § 541.

104. Id. § 547.
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probably be engulfed in litigation and will have an opportunity to allow a court to decide this point.
Overall, if the surety has not filed to perfect its security agreement
prior to default, it would be prudent to do so upon default. However,
the likelihood of additional recoveries is not good and litigation may
arise if bankruptcy is filed shortly thereafter. The real risk in doing
so, however, is that the courts will find an election to pursue the
surety's legal rights at the expense of its equitable subrogation rights
which in turn may equate to a real loss from such last minute
maneuvers.
D.

Filing When Necessary Under the Circumstances May Be the Best
Solution

As such, the question "Should the surety rely on its rights of equitable subrogation or file under the U.C.C.?" does not have a clear answer. Theoretically, the lawyer will tell the surety to file to protect
itself from loss. Practically, it may not be worth the time, effort, expense, and consequences of filing. Pragmatically, it is suggested that
reliance on equitable subrogation is easy and efficient, but with some
measure of risk which should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In
those cases where filing is appropriate, possible, or absolutely necessary, then filing should be made. Otherwise, you may well benefit by
carefully screening your clients and insisting on good provisions in
both bond documents and contracts. Ultimately, working with the
contractor, the owner, and the banks to fashion solutions and to avoid
later disputes may well be the best answer to the question of whether
or not the indemnity agreement should be filed under the U.C.C.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.C.C. was designed to facilitate the taking of security for repayment of debt. As such, it is not well designed to protect the surety
in a situation of contingent, unliquidated liability where the real object is to complete the project efficiently and expeditiously.
On the other hand, equitable subrogation is designed to protect the
surety's interest in taking over and completing the project and to assure recourse to the contract balances which are the fruits of such efforts. However, equitable subrogation offers little recourse against
other assets of the contractor and it does not serve the purpose of ultimate recoupment of losses incurred.
The doctrine of equitable subrogation has limitations even as to
contract balances, primarily because the surety must always find
someone's rights to assert which are superior to those of the contractor's secured creditors. The confusion over the theoretical basis of the
surety's position created by Pearlman also leaves the door open for
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further judicial changes in the doctrine. One thing, however, is very
clear; namely, that the surety will be grossly plagued in his performance of his obligation to complete if he is denied the right to take over
the work. This means he must have immediate access to materials on
site (or in storage with permission of the owner) and be allowed to
continue working with performing subcontractors, all with an objective to fulfill its promise to complete the defaulting contractor's
performance.
It is suggested that the need to protect the surety should be based
not only on principles of subrogation but additionally upon the principles of unjust enrichment as used in the Aetna Casualty case.10 5 To do
so would help solve the dispute created by the split of opinion in Pearlman and it would certainly avoid the nagging question of whether materialmen have rights in contract proceeds which may be asserted by a
surety performing under a payment bond, especially in public construction contracts.
In all fairness, however, it must be realized that the bank's assertions of the superiority of the U.C.C. is not truly based upon theoretical considerations. It is based upon the fact that when a contractor
defaults, all his creditors are scrambling to avoid losses. In this scramble, the surety is a competitor and the U.C.C. is a weapon which may
be used either by or against it.
Ultimately, the doctrine of equitable subrogation is both a necessary safeguard and an important incentive to the surety to perform
the work for which the surety issued the bond. Before equitable subrogation can be replaced by the U.C.C., the U.C.C. needs to be modified to accommodate the surety's unusual position and to give it the
projections and incentives that sureties need and require.

105. U.C.C. § 9-507.

